The Upside of the Downside: Local Human Rights and the Federalism Clauses by Davis, Martha F.
Saint Louis University Law Journal 
Volume 62 
Number 4 Human Rights in the American 
Criminal Justice System (Summer 2018) 
Article 11 
2018 
The Upside of the Downside: Local Human Rights and the 
Federalism Clauses 
Martha F. Davis 
Northeastern University School of Law, m.davis@northeastern.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/lj 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Martha F. Davis, The Upside of the Downside: Local Human Rights and the Federalism Clauses, 62 St. 
Louis U. L.J. (2018). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/lj/vol62/iss4/11 
This Childress Lecture is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Commons. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in Saint Louis University Law Journal by an authorized editor of Scholarship Commons. For more 
information, please contact Susie Lee. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
 
921 
THE UPSIDE OF THE DOWNSIDE: LOCAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND 
THE FEDERALISM CLAUSES 
MARTHA F. DAVIS* 
INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. government has ratified three of the major international human 
rights treaties: the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(“ICCPR”), the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”), and the Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (“CERD”).1 In the course 
of each ratification process, the United States has asserted a package of 
“reservations, declarations or understandings” (known as “RUDs”) in order to 
condition the scope of the obligations that it undertakes with its ratification.2 
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties defines a reservation as “a 
unilateral statement . . . made by a State, when signing, ratifying, accepting, 
approving or acceding to a treaty, whereby it purports to exclude or to modify 
the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their application to that 
State.”3 There is no formal definition of either a declaration or an understanding, 
but like reservations, they are generally understood to be statements by state 
parties intended to narrow or refine their treaty obligations.4 
 
* Associate Dean of Experiential Education and Professor of Law, Northeastern University School 
of Law. Thanks to Anna Annino, Alicia Cook, Max Dismukes, and Gary Howell-Walton for their 
research assistance, and to Jennifer True for her administrative support. 
 1. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Sept. 8, 1992, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 
[hereinafter ICCPR]; Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter CAT]; International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 
195 [hereinafter CERD]. 
 2. See Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost of Senator 
Bricker, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 341, 341 (1995) (describing the package of RUDs attached to the 
ICCPR, CAT, and CERD). 
 3. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 2, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 
(entered into force on Jan. 27, 1980). 
 4. The International Law Commission, a body of the United Nations, has recognized 
“interpretive declarations” in the context of treaty ratification. See INT’L LAW COMM’N, GUIDE TO 
PRACTICE ON RESERVATIONS TO TREATIES 3 (2011), http://legal.un.org/docs/?path=../ilc/texts/in 
struments/english/draft_articles/1_8_2011.pdf&lang=EF  [https://perma.cc/C2GT-6CLG]. For a 
domestic definition of RUDs, see CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 66–922 CC, TREATIES AND OTHER 
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE 11 (2001) (setting out 
typology of RUDs). 
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RUDs are often controversial because they have the potential to undermine 
the integrity and impact of a treaty. The United States’ extensive use of RUDs 
in its ratification processes has been widely criticized by UN bodies and by other 
UN member nations.5 Domestic U.S. human rights advocates have also 
challenged the United States’ use of RUDs, sometimes arguing that it would be 
better to simply not ratify a treaty rather than riddle it with RUDs.6   
As part of its package of RUDs, the United States has attached a so-called 
“federalism understanding” to each of the three ratified treaties cited above, 
which sets out the United States’ understanding of its treaty obligations in light 
of the tiered federal nature of the U.S. government.7 Domestic advocates have 
expressed concerns about whether this understanding is intended by the federal 
government to avoid its treaty implementation obligations, and they have 
frequently criticized the scope of the federalism clause.8 Defenders and critics 
alike have suggested that the clause is designed to protect subnational 
prerogatives even as the federal government takes on treaty obligations through 
ratification.9 
The federalism clause undoubtedly has the potential to undermine the 
cohesion of U.S. human rights obligations, as it might be construed to exempt 
the federal government from primary responsibility for significant areas of 
human rights realization. But I want to temporarily lay those concerns to one 
side for purposes of this Article. Instead of railing against RUDs, I seek to 
explore what happens if we suspend concerns about federal accountability under 
international human rights law and simply accept the federalism clause at face 
 
 5. See, e.g., Kristina Ash, U.S. Reservations to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights: Credibility Maximization and Global Influence, 3 NW. J. INTL HUM. RTS. 1, 5 
(2005); see also M. Cherif Bassiouni, Reflections on the Ratification of the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights by the United States Senate, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 1169, 1177 (1993) 
(discussing other nations’ objections to U.S. RUDs). 
 6. See, e.g., Antonia Chayes, How American Treaty Behavior Threatens National Security, 
33 INT’L SEC’Y 45, 52–53 (2008); Kenneth Roth, The Charade of US Ratification of International 
Human Rights Treaties, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L. 347, 347 (2000); see also Janet Benshoof, Twisted Treaty 
Shafts U.S. Women, ON THE ISSUES (2009), http://www.ontheissuesmagazine.com/2009winter/ 
2009winter_5.php [https://perma.cc/6H2U-3K6U] (arguing that U.S. RUDs “make CEDAW 
worthless”). 
 7. See Henkin, supra note 2, at 5. 
 8. See, e.g., Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 3, art. 2(1)(a) (defining a 
treaty as “an international agreement concluded between States”); Penny Venetis, Making Human 
Rights Treaty Law Actionable in the United States: The Case for Universal Implementing 
Legislation, 63 ALA. L. REV. 97, 159 (2011). 
 9. Oona A. Hathaway et al., The Treaty Power: Its History, Scope and Limits, 98 CORNELL 
L. REV. 239, 319 (2013) (“[T]he established practice of adding federalism RUDs represents an 
effort to avoid constitutional confrontation between the states and federal treaty power.”); Edward 
T. Swaine, Does Federalism Constrain the Treaty Power?, 103 COLO. L. REV. 403, 444 (2003) 
(“[F]ederalism RUDs might themselves establish a new constitutional norm respecting state 
sovereignty.”). 
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value. In an era when subnational governments are increasingly engaged with 
human rights implementation, might the federalism clause have a more positive, 
affirmative aspect? Is it possible that, rather than articulating a limitation on 
federal responsibility, the clause endorses state and local governments’ authority 
to pursue human rights strategies in areas within their jurisdiction and expressly 
limits federal interference with appropriate subnational human rights activities, 
perhaps even circumscribing the federal government’s powers of preemption?10  
This Article proceeds as follows. Following this introduction, Part I reviews 
the texts of the federalism clauses (in order of U.S. ratification) that have been 
attached to the CAT, ICCPR, and CERD, and those that have been proposed for 
two unratified treaties, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (“CEDAW”), and the Convention on the Rights 
of Persons with Disabilities (“CRPD”). Part II then analyzes the domestic legal 
significance of these clauses, with particular reference to the decision in Bond v. 
United States.11 Part III examines the potential relevance of federalism clauses 
in two contexts: (1) local adoption of the “Human Rights City” status; and (2) 
subnational adoption of the sanctuary jurisdiction status. Finally, a brief 
conclusion offers suggestions for local human rights actors in light of the United 
States’ wide and repeated endorsement of the federalism clauses, and—still 
suspending concerns about gaps in federal accountability—considers how 
human rights advocates might work within that framework.  
I.  THE FEDERALISM CLAUSES 
Federalism clauses appear in each of the three major human rights treaties 
ratified by the United States, and in two major human rights treaties that have 
been proposed but not ratified by the United States.12 Each of these clauses has 
its own unique wording. The slightly different formulations give indications as 
to the meaning and intent of the provisions.  
 
 10. Swaine off-handedly rejected the possibility that RUDs are the “source of a duty to 
implement.” Swaine, supra note 9, at 442–43. This article, however, focuses on RUDs as a shield 
against federal preemption or other federal interference rather than a basis for an affirmative legal 
duty inuring to local governments. For more discussion of local human rights and preemption, see 
Martha F. Davis, Upstairs, Downstairs: Subnational Incorporation of International Human Rights 
Law at the End of an Era, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 411, 424–38 (2008). For an important but 
preliminary discussion of how the federalism understandings might affect preemption, see Johanna 
Kalb, The Persistence of Dualism in Human Rights Treaty Implementation, 30 YALE L. & POL’Y 
REV. 71, 85 n.57 (2011). 
 11. 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014). 
 12. ICCPR, supra note 1, at U.N.T.S. 171; CERD, supra note 1, at 660 U.N.T.S. 195; CAT, 
supra note 1, at 1465 U.N.T.S. 85; G.A. Res. 34/180, U.N. Doc. A/34/46, Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (Dec. 18, 1979) [hereinafter Women’s 
Convention]; Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 2515 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter 
CPRD]. 
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The CAT was opened for ratification in 1984 and now has 162 state parties, 
including the United States.13 In ratifying the CAT in 1990, the United States 
adopted the following federalism understanding: 
[T]he United States understands that this Convention shall be implemented by 
the United States Government to the extent that it exercises legislative and 
judicial jurisdiction over the matters covered by the Convention and otherwise 
by the state and local governments. Accordingly, in implementing Articles 10-
14 and 16, the United States Government shall take measures appropriate to the 
Federal system to the end that the competent authorities of the constituent units 
of the United States of America may take appropriate measures for the 
fulfillment of the Convention.14 
The referenced articles of the CAT address the implementation of the 
Convention’s provisions through education efforts directed to law enforcement 
and other relevant personnel, and integration of the provisions into all levels of 
criminal law decision-making, measures that would require independent state 
and local action under the U.S. federal system.15 
Commenting on the CAT Federalism clause, David Stewart, a State 
Department official, called the understanding “convoluted.”16 Perhaps in 
reaction to this observation, the federalism clause submitted with U.S. 
ratification of the ICCPR in 1992, took a somewhat more streamlined approach, 
stating that: 
[T]he United States understands that this Covenant shall be implemented by the 
Federal Government to the extent that it exercises legislative and judicial 
jurisdiction over the matters covered therein, and otherwise by the state and local 
governments; to the extent that state and local governments exercise jurisdiction 
over such matters, the Federal Government shall take measures appropriate to 
the Federal system to the end that the competent authorities of the state or local 
governments may take appropriate measures for the fulfillment of the 
Covenant.17 
 
 
 13. CAT, supra note 1, at 1465 U.N.T.S. 85. 
 14. 136 CONG. REC. S17486-01 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990). 
 15. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (striking down interim 
legislation enlisting local law enforcement officers in gun background checks as violating the Tenth 
Amendment). 
 16. David P. Stewart, United States Ratification of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: 
The Significance of the Reservations, Understandings, and Declarations, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 1183, 
1200 (1993). 
 17. 138 CONG. REC. S4784 (1992). For an excellent discussion of the legislative history and 
federal posture with regard to the ICCPR’s federalism understanding, see David Kaye, State 
Execution of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 95, 
104-10 (2013). 
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Importantly, this understanding does not include limiting citations to 
particular articles of the treaty along the lines of the CAT understanding, but 
instead applies generally to the entirety of the treaty’s subject matter. Given the 
absence of limiting language, this understanding seems to recognize the 
potential for subnational governments’ independent human rights authority over 
a wide range of subject areas that lie beyond the federal government’s legislative 
or judicial jurisdiction.18 For example, in its first monitoring report to the UN 
Human Rights Committee on United States compliance with the ICCPR, the 
United States averred that federal authority was constrained in “matters such as 
education, public health, business organization, work conditions, marriage and 
divorce, the care of children and exercise of the ordinary police power.”19  
Two years after the ICCPR ratification, in 1994, the Senate approved an 
even more streamlined federalism clause attached to U.S. ratification of the 
CERD: 
[T]he United States understands that this Convention shall be implemented by 
the Federal Government to the extent that it exercises jurisdiction over the 
matters covered therein, and otherwise by the state and local governments. To 
the extent that state and local governments exercise jurisdiction over such 
matters, the Federal Government shall, as necessary, take appropriate measures 
to ensure the fulfillment of this Convention.20 
Like the ICCPR’s federalism clause, this provision seems to recognize 
limitations on federal jurisdiction over matters covered by the Covenant. At the 
same time, like the other understandings noted above, it provides assurances that 
the federal government will take “appropriate measures,” “as necessary” to 
support state and local governments’ fulfillment of their implementation 
obligations.21 
In its initial report to the United Nations on CERD compliance, submitted 
in 2000, the United States noted the significant overlap of federal, state, and 
local jurisdictions over racial discrimination issues.22 The government 
specifically acknowledged local and regional variations, noting that “[i]n some 
states, courts have interpreted their state constitutions to provide even broader 
protections against discrimination than under federal law.”23 As interpreted by 
 
 18. See Kaye, supra note 17, at 108 (“One possibility is that ratification would provide a tool 
for federal, state, and local actors to ensure compliance with human rights law at an administrative 
level.”). 
 19. Kalb, supra note 10, at 84 (citing U.N. Human Rights Comm., Initial Rep. of States Parties 
Due in 1993: United States of America, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/81/Add.4 (Aug. 24, 1994)). 
 20. 140 CONG. REC. S7634 (1994). 
 21. Id. 
 22. Comm. on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Third Periodic Rep. of 
States Parties Due in 1999, Addendum: United States of America, ¶ 163, U.N. Doc. 
CERD/C/351/Add.1 (Oct. 10, 2000). 
 23. Id. ¶ 165. 
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the government, however, more rights-protective local initiatives were shielded, 
at least to some degree, by the treaty’s terms. According to the United States, 
“[b]ecause the fundamental requirements of the Convention are respected and 
complied with at all levels of government, the United States concluded there was 
no need to pre-empt these state and local initiatives . . . through the exercise of 
the constitutional treaty power.”24  
Two treaties submitted by the Executive branch for the Senate’s 
consideration but never formally ratified also included proposed federalism 
clauses. CEDAW was approved by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 
July 2002, but it has never been submitted to the full Senate for consideration, 
which is necessary for final ratification.25 CEDAW’s proposed federalism 
understanding, which would be subject to additional Senate debate were the 
treaty to go forward, reads as follows: 
[T]he United States understands that this Convention shall be implemented by 
the Federal Government to the extent that it exercises jurisdiction over the 
matters covered (by the Convention), and otherwise by the state and local 
governments. To the extent that state and local governments exercise jurisdiction 
over such matters, the Federal Government shall, as necessary, take appropriate 
measures to ensure the fulfillment of this Convention.26 
The Senate Committee report endorsing CEDAW ratification explained that the 
federalism clause was necessary because:  
Many of the specific areas covered by the Convention (such as education) are 
within the purview of state and local governments, rather than the federal 
government. Although U.S. law does not proscribe the federal government from 
committing its constituent units to the goal of non-discrimination, U.S. law does 
provide limitations on the federal role in some areas. To reflect this situation, 
this understanding makes clear that the United States will carry out its 
obligations under the Convention in a manner consistent with the federal nature 
of its form of government.27  
Through this understanding, the federal government acknowledged its 
“supreme” role in implementing anti-discrimination goals nationwide, but 
nevertheless noted federal “limitations” in some areas addressed by CEDAW. 
Education might be one such area. 
 
 24. Id. ¶ 166. 
 25. James Dao, Senate Panel Approves Treaty Banning Bias Against Women, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 31, 2002, at A3; see generally LISA BALDEZ, DEFYING CONVENTION: U.S. RESISTANCE TO 
THE U.N. TREATY ON WOMEN’S RIGHTS (2014). 
 26. Claiborne Pell, Comm. on Foreign Relations, S. EXEC. REP. NO. 102–23, at 18 (2002); see 
also Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Reflections on the Proposed United States Reservations to CEDAW: 
Should the Constitution Be an Obstacle to Human Rights?, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 727, 753–
54 (1996) (discussing political aspects of treaty reservations in the United States) 
 27. Joseph Biden, Comm. on Foreign Relations, S. EXEC. REP. NO. 107–9 (2002). 
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Like the CEDAW, the Disabilities Convention has not been ratified, but it 
has gone farther along in the process, as it reached the Senate floor before failing 
to achieve the requisite two-thirds majority of votes on December 4, 2012.28 
That vote did not end the matter for all time, but rather put the Convention back 
in the queue for reintroduction at some point in the future should Senate sponsors 
put it forward.29 The proposed CRPD also included federalism language, but the 
provision was designated as a reservation rather than an understanding:  
To the extent that state and local governments exercise jurisdiction over issues 
covered by the convention, U.S. obligations under the convention are limited to 
the U.S. government taking measures appropriate to the federal system, such as 
enforcement under the ADA, with the ultimate objective of full implementation 
of the convention.30 
Notably, the CRPD reservation addresses specific boundaries between federal 
and state responsibilities, stating that ADA enforcement is an obligation of 
federal authorities while state and local governments retain jurisdiction over 
other issues covered by the Convention.  
In the case of the CRPD, the explanation for the Reservation offered by the 
U.S. executive branch and endorsed by the Senate, clearly invokes the Bricker 
Amendment, a by-gone legislative effort to limit the domestic impact of treaty 
ratification.31 The Senate’s report prepared in support of ratification explains the 
Reservation as follows:  
Because certain provisions of the Convention concern matters traditionally 
governed by state law rather than federal law, and because in very limited 
instances some state and local standards are less vigorous than the Convention 
would require, a reservation is required to preserve the existing balance between 
federal and state jurisdiction over these matters.32 
 
 28. See S. TREATY DOC. NO. 112–7 (2012); LUISA BLANCHFIELD & CYNTHIA BROWN, 
CONG. RESEARCH SERV. R42749, UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS 
WITH DISABILITIES: ISSUES IN THE U.S. RATIFICATION DEBATE 1 (2015) (recording vote number 
219, with sixty-one yeas and thirty-eight nays). 
 29. COMM. ON RULES & ADMIN., STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, S. DOC. NO. 113–18, at 
43 (2013) (Rule XXX: Proceeding on Treaties); BLANCHFIELD & BROWN, supra note 28; Thomas 
D. Grant, The U.N. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD): Some 
Observations on U.S. Participation, 25 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 171, 172 (2015). 
 30. S. TREATY DOC. NO. 112–7, at 1 (2012). 
 31. In the 1950s, at the height of concern about international encroachment on domestic law, 
U.S. Senator John Bricker proposed a constitutional amendment that would have made all treaties 
non-self-executing. The proposal narrowly failed. The term “Bricker Amendment” has 
subsequently come to signify a wider range of proposals that would limit the domestic impact of 
treaties. See, e.g., Eric Chung, Note, The Judicial Enforceability and Legal Effects of Treaty 
Reservations, Understandings and Declarations, 126 YALE L.J. 170, 177–78, nn.18–20 (2016) 
(citing articles on Bricker and RUDs); Henkin, supra note 2, at 341, 348–49. 
 32. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH 
DISABILITIES, S. REP. NO. 112–6, at 21 (2012). See also Public Hearing on Convention on the 
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Alone among the federalism clauses, this one – the sole federalism provision 
designated as a reservation – is explicitly intended to protect local derogation 
from the impact of federal treaty obligations. Importantly, this reservation would 
not only sanction derogation but would also presumptively allow more vigorous 
local human rights implementation in areas outside of federal purview.  
This brief survey of federalism clauses indicates that the most extreme of 
the provisions under consideration as part of U.S. treaty ratification—the 
reservation attached to the CRPD—is intended to insulate subnational 
governments that fall short of treaty standards. Other federalism clauses do not 
go so far, and instead, carve out particular spheres for subnational leadership on 
treaty compliance. All of the clauses preserve for states and localities the 
possibility of treaty compliance efforts that exceed federal efforts, while 
providing assurance that the federal government will not impede such efforts.  
II.  DOMESTIC LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE OF FEDERALISM CLAUSES 
Recent scholarship on RUDs has focused on their domestic enforceability, 
finding through exhaustive case analysis that domestic court majorities have 
almost always recognized RUDs to be operative and enforceable when domestic 
treaty implementation is at issue.33 For example, a recent survey of case law 
reports that “lower courts have repeatedly upheld RUDs stating that certain 
treaties or treaty provisions are non-self-executing, most prominently in cases 
involving the ICCPR.”34 
Unlike the non-self-executing RUDS, federalism understandings in U.S.-
ratified treaties have not been specifically interpreted in domestic litigation.35 
However, the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Bond v. United States, while not 
explicitly addressing a federalism understanding, elucidates the structural 
limitations of federal implementation of an international treaty.36  
The Bond facts are memorable. In brief, a woman involved in a romantic 
triangle tried to use a highly toxic chemical to threaten and potentially harm her 
romantic rival.37 Among other things, she smeared the chemical on her rival’s 
mailbox, triggering the concern of the U.S. Postal Service and thus, the federal 
government.38 A zealous federal prosecutor charged the woman with violating 
Section 229 of the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998 
 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 112th Cong., at 
42 (2012) (statement of Eve Hill, Senior Counselor to Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights) 
(explaining how reservations prevent the convention from impacting domestic parental rights); 
BLANCHFIELD & BROWN, supra note 28, at 10–11. 
 33. Chung, supra note 31, at 176. 
 34. Id. at 188–96, n.74 (citing cases). 
 35. Id. at 182–92. 
 36. 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2081 (2014). 
 37. Id. at 2085. 
 38. Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2018] THE UPSIDE OF THE DOWNSIDE 929 
(“CWCIA”), which criminalizes, among other things, the possession or use of 
“chemical weapons.”39 In response, the defendant argued that the Chemical 
Weapons Convention could not constitutionally support a congressional act that 
federalized simple assault and impinged on state criminal law prerogatives.40 
Because the domestic statute at issue was enacted to implement the international 
Chemical Weapons Convention, the U.S. government’s intent in ratifying the 
Convention played an important role in the Supreme Court’s consideration of 
the issues.41 
Ultimately, the Supreme Court issued a decision written by Chief Justice 
Roberts that carved out a middle ground.42 The Court adopted a narrowing 
construction of the statute in order to save the CWCIA, determining that 
Congress did not intend ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention to 
federalize such minor and personal possession and use of dangerous 
chemicals.43 By taking this approach, the Court indicated that a broader 
construction of federal authority under the CWCIA would be untenable because 
it would federalize areas of law reserved to states.44 Such an overreach would 
extend beyond Congressional authority and upset the “constitutional balance” 
between states and the federal government.45 In other words, the Bond court read 
into the treaty a federalism clause that circumscribed the federal ability to 
implement the treaty at every level of government and reserved such 
implementation activities for state and local governments.46 
The calibrated approach taken by Chief Justice Roberts in Bond avoided 
overruling the venerable 1920 case of Missouri v. Holland, which adopted a 
much broader view of federal authority to implement international obligations.47 
In 1918, Congress enacted a federal law to regulate the hunting of migratory 
birds throughout the United States.48 The state of Missouri challenged the law, 
 
 39. Tess deLiefde, Note, Filling in the Gaps: A New Approach to Treaty Implementation 
Reconciling the Supremacy Clause and Federalism Concerns, 66 U. MIAMI L. REV. 567, 574–75 
(2012) (discussing Bond litigation leading up to Supreme Court review). 
 40. Id. at 568. 
 41. Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2083–84 (reviewing drafting and ratification of Chemical Weapon 
Convention). 
 42. David Sloss is critical of the interpretation adopted by the majority opinion but accepts it 
as the lesser of two evils when compared with Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion. See David Sloss, 
Bond v. United States: Choosing the Lesser of Two Evils, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1583, 1584 
(2015). 
 43. Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2088–90. 
 44. Id. at 2083. 
 45. Id. at 2091. 
 46. Id. at 2092. 
 47. See, e.g., Sloss, supra note 42, at 1595. 
 48. 252 U.S. 416, 430–31 (1920). 
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arguing that it impinged on traditional areas of state control.49 The U.S. 
government countered that the domestic statute implemented the terms of an 
international treaty on migratory birds entered into by Great Britain (acting for 
Canada) and the United States.50 Citing the strength of the Constitution’s 
Supremacy Clause and its designation of treaties as “the Supreme law of the 
land,” the U.S. Supreme Court upheld Congress’s authority to enact the federal 
implementing statute in the face of Missouri’s challenge.51   
Missouri v. Holland has been both criticized and praised for its broad view 
of federal power vis-à-vis states.52 Bond certainly takes a narrower view of 
federal power. Yet by reading an implicit federalism understanding into the 
Chemical Weapons Convention, the Supreme Court was able to preserve 
Missouri v. Holland while avoiding the admittedly absurd result of prosecuting 
an isolated personal vendetta as chemical warfare of international dimensions.53  
That is not to say that Missouri v. Holland could not be factually and legally 
distinguished from United States v. Bond. Even had the migratory bird treaty 
included an explicit federalism clause (much less an implicit one), the analysis 
would not have been the same as that in Bond, given the inherently national (and 
transnational) nature of migratory birds.54 In contrast, in Bond, the implicit 
federalism understanding led the Court to conclude that the prosecutor had 
overreached, and that the treaty could not support federal prosecution of such a 
local crime.55 In sum, the Court took the position that, consistent with the text 
of the explicit federalism clauses that the United States has attached to ratified 
and unratified international treaties, some aspects of treaty implementation are 
left to states and states alone.56  
 
 49. For background on this law, see Margaret E. McGuinness, Foreword to Symposium: 
Return to Missouri v. Holland: Federalism and International Law, 73 MO. L. REV. 921, 921–25 
(2008). 
 50. Id. at 924. 
 51. Holland, 252 U.S. at 432. 
 52. Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 MICH. L. REV. 390, 
421–25 (1998) (criticizing proposition that Congress can enact laws beyond the scope of its Art. 1 
powers). 
 53. See, e.g., Roger P. Alford, Bond and the Vienna Rules, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1561, 
1574 (2015) (noting the absurdity of reading “chemical weapons” broadly). 
 54. Franz Bairlein, The study of bird migrations – some future perspectives, 50 BIRD STUDY 
243, 244 (2003) (mapping transnational bird migration routes). 
 55. Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2091–92 (2014). 
 56. The result in Medellin provides an additional gloss on this. There, the Court found that the 
Executive was powerless to mandate state compliance with the Vienna Convention on Consular 
Affairs, but it indicated that Congress might enact a law that would require compliance with the 
Convention’s terms, presumably preempting any conflicting local laws. Medellin v. Texas, 552 
U.S. 491, 519 (2008). Like the issue in Missouri v. Holland, the consular notification at issue in 
Medellin was clearly international in nature, and thus within appropriate federal purview. 
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III.  PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS CITIES AND SANCTUARY 
JURISDICTIONS 
In furtherance of U.S. obligations under ratified human rights treaties, some 
local governments have adopted policies that explicitly or implicitly seek to 
realize the human rights of their residents. Below, I discuss two examples of this 
local take-up of human rights: (1) human rights cities; and (2) sanctuary 
jurisdictions.  
A. Human Rights Cities 
Human rights cities are local governments that have adopted the principles 
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights or another formal human rights 
document as a guiding principle for local governance.57 There are dozens of 
human rights cities around the world, with several located in the United States, 
including Boston, Washington, D.C., Pittsburgh, and Mountain View, 
California.58 While San Francisco has not formally declared itself a human rights 
city, it has adopted CEDAW as part of its municipal law and is widely 
considered to be a leader in local human rights implementation.59 
Taking the federalism understandings and relevant case law at face value, 
there are several areas where local governments such as human rights cities 
might take the lead in treaty implementation and human rights realization in the 
 
 57. For additional background on human rights cities, see GLOBAL URBAN JUSTICE: THE RISE 
OF HUMAN RIGHTS CITIES (Barbara Oomen, Martha F. Davis & Michele Grigolo eds., 2016); 
STEPHEN P. MARKS, KATHLEEN A. MODROWSKI & WALTER LICHEM, HUMAN RIGHTS CITIES: 
CIVIC ENGAGEMENT FOR SOCIETAL DEVELOPMENT 46 (2008); Jackie Smith, Responding to 
Globalization and Urban Conflict: Human Rights Cities Initiatives, 11 STUDIES IN SOC. JUST. 347 
(2017). 
 58. See, e.g., CITY COUNCIL OF BOSTON, RESOLUTION PROCLAIMING BOSTON AS A HUMAN 
RIGHTS CITY (2011), http://meetingrecords.cityofboston.gov/sirepub/cache/2/z3dzg0rz40j5chp5m 
ptuahhk/1039503172018032548314.PDF [https://perma.cc/94FB-SNUG]; Washington, D.C. 
Human Rights City Resolution, AM. FRIENDS SERV. COMM., https://www.afsc.org/resource/wash 
ington-dc-human-rights-city-resolution [https://perma.cc/39TS-P63R]; Mark Noack, Council 
Votes to Make Mountain View a Human Rights City, MOUNTAIN VIEW VOICE (Dec. 20, 2016), 
https://www.mv-voice.com/news/2016/12/20/council-votes-to-make-mountain-view-a-human-
rights-city [https://perma.cc/K6HQ-7KR7]; CITY COUNCIL OF MOUNTAIN VIEW, REPORT: HUMAN 
RIGHTS CITY DESIGNATION (Dec. 13, 2016), https://mountainview.legistar.com/LegislationDetail. 
aspx?ID=2904855&GUID=6C57A4DE-84CE-4053-B7EC-93D389242C97 [https://perma.cc/7A 
FJ-X7AS]; PITTSBURGH HUMAN RIGHTS CITY ALLIANCE, http://pgh-humanrightscity.wiki 
spaces.com/ [https://perma.cc/E5C5-64NM]. See generally Kenneth Neubeck, In a State of 
Becoming a Human Rights City: The Case of Eugene, Oregon, in Oomen, et al., supra note 57, at 
240 (listing cities). 
 59. See Stacy Lozner, Diffusion of Local Regulatory Innovations: The San Francisco CEDAW 
Ordinance and the New York City Human Rights Initiative, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 768, 777–79 
(2004). 
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United States. Addressing the issue of homelessness is one example.60 The 
National Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty has detailed the many ways 
in which local criminal sanctions imposed for loitering, camping, and other 
incidents common to lack of housing amount to criminalization of homelessness 
in violation of many provisions of the ICCPR to which the United States is a 
party.61 The international community has confirmed that such measures violate 
international human rights norms.62 But since the particular regulatory measures 
involved—e.g., zoning ordinances, local criminal laws—are primarily the 
province of subnational regulation in our federal system, meeting these national 
human rights obligations requires local participation and even leadership.63  
At times, the United States has used international mechanisms as a means to 
show its support for such local initiatives. For example, in 2014, the U.S. 
government invited Salt Lake City Mayor Ralph Becker to attend the UN Human 
Rights Committee’s review of United States compliance with its obligations 
under the ICCPR. Mayor Becker testified to the international body regarding 
Salt Lake City’s progressive approach to resolving chronic homelessness of 
veterans.64  
 
 60. See generally NAT’L LAW CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, NO SAFE PLACE: THE 
CRIMINALIZATION OF HOMELESSNESS IN U.S. CITIES 11 (2014), https://www.nlchp.org/docu 
ments/No_Safe_Place [https://perma.cc/6VUS-AXYT]. 
 61. See, e.g., NAT’L LAW CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, CRUEL, INHUMAN, AND 
DEGRADING: HOMELESSNESS IN THE UNITED STATES UNDER THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON 
CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS (2013), https://www.nlchp.org/documents/Cruel_Inhuman_and_De 
grading [https://perma.cc/V5HQ-SKBJ]. 
 62. See, e.g., Leilani Farha (Special Rapporteur), Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on adequate 
housing as a component of the right to an adequate standard of living, and on the right to non-
discrimination in this context, at 7, Hum Rts. Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/31/54 (2015). 
 63. See, e.g., YALE LAW SCHOOL ALLARD K. LOWENSTEIN INT’L HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC, 
“FORCED INTO BREAKING THE LAW”: THE CRIMINALIZATION OF HOMELESSNESS IN 
CONNECTICUT 2–4 (2016), https://law.yale.edu/system/files/documents/pdf/news/criminalization 
_of_homelessness_report_for_web_executive_summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/9R3B-6V2B] 
(describing city ordinances contributing to criminalization of homelessness). Significantly, the U.S. 
Interagency Council on Homelessness, a U.S. federal agency that leads federal implementation of 
policies to address homelessness, has adopted a human rights frame in its work after hearing from 
policy advocates about the issue of criminalized poverty. See U.S. INTERAGENCY COUNCIL ON 
HOMELESSNESS, SEARCHING OUT SOLUTIONS: CONSTRUCTIVE ALTERNATIVES TO THE 
CRIMINALIZATION OF HOMELESSNESS 6–7 (2012), https://www.usich.gov/resources/uploads/asset 
_library/Searching_Out_Solutions_2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/G2EL-2ZKE]; Eric S. Tars, et al., 
HUMAN RIGHTS TO HUMAN REALITY: A 10 STEP GUIDE TO STRATEGIC HUMAN RIGHTS 
ADVOCACY 13–14 (Nat’l Law Ctr. on Homelessness & Poverty, 2014), https://www.nlchp.org/doc 
uments/Human_Rights_to_Human_Reality [https://perma.cc/T3FD-TU9J]. 
 64. COLUMBIA LAW SCH. HUMAN RIGHTS INST., BRINGING HUMAN RIGHTS HOME: THE 
BIRMINGHAM MAYOR’S OFFICE HUMAN RIGHTS DIALOGUE 3 (2015), http://www.law.columbia. 
edu/sites/default/files/microsites/human-rights-institute/files/birmingham_outcomes_document_ 
september_2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/3CWX-NEJX] (noting Salt Lake City Mayor Ralph 
Becker’s testimony before the UN Human Rights Committee). 
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Generally, however, cities develop policies on homelessness outside of 
federal human rights oversight. For example, Eugene, Oregon, an aspiring 
human rights city, has been explicit in relying on human rights frames to address 
homelessness consistent with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and 
the ICCPR.65 An important component of Eugene, Oregon’s approach has been 
to ensure that the voices of homeless individuals are heard, and that homeless 
individuals are able to participate in city decisions that will affect them.66 
Eugene has also adopted a unique decision-making framework, the Triple 
Bottom Line, that includes an assessment of human rights impacts of municipal 
decisions.67 These initiatives have all been taken without direct federal 
engagement. 
Could Congressional ICCPR implementation be a vehicle for federal 
preemption of local human rights measures such as those adopted in Eugene? 
Theoretically, yes; the result in Missouri v. Holland, broadly construed, 
indicates that such preemption would be possible. Relying on Holland, Congress 
might enact the “ICCPR Implementation Act” to impose common standards on 
the treatment of homelessness nationwide, grounding the legislation in the treaty 
power.68  
However, the federalism clause in the ICCPR may provide a backstop for 
such federal action, since it pledges that preemption can occur only when the 
federal intervention is “appropriate.”69 The term “appropriate” in the federalism 
understanding is not defined. There is a common-sense argument that only a 
federal approach that is more rights-protective than the state regime that it 
replaces would pass muster under this test. This seems to be the presumption 
adopted by the U.S. government in its first CERD report, where it expressly 
declined to preempt more aggressive state-level anti-discrimination measures. 
Indeed, it is a basic precept of international human rights law that states’ 
signatories to a treaty may not take actions that would defeat the object and 
purpose of a treaty or regress in their implementation of relevant treaty norms, 
 
 65. See Kenneth J. Neubeck, In a State of Becoming a Human Rights City: The Case of 
Eugene, Oregon, in HUMAN RIGHTS CITIES AND REGIONS: SWEDISH AND INTERNATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVES 59, 66 (Martha F. Davis et al., eds. 2017), http://rwi.lu.se/app/uploads/2017/03/Hu 
man-Rights-Cities-web.pdf [https://perma.cc/2L73-XZUN]. 
 66. Id. See also HRC Homelessness Work Group Meeting Minutes 11/14/17, EUGENE HUM. 
RTS. COMMISSION HOMELESSNESS WORK GROUP (Nov. 14, 2017), https://hrchwg.wordpress.com/ 
2017/11/16/hrc-homelessness-work-group-meeting-minutes-11-14-17/ [https://perma.cc/2URZ-5 
AKZ] (discussing ways to ensure that homeless individuals can meaningfully address policy issues, 
citing human rights frames). 
 67. Neubeck, supra note 65, at 63–64. 
 68. As in Bond and Holland, there would likely be other Article I vehicles that would also 
support Congressional action, such as the Commerce Clause. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, The 
Internationalism of American Federalism: Missouri and Holland, 73 MO. L. REV. 1105, 1115 
(2008). 
 69. For full discussion of federalism clauses, see supra Part I. 
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even though they have stopped short of ratification.70 By domesticating that 
international standard through the condition that any federal intervention be 
“appropriate,” the federalism understanding may provide support (and 
protection from preemption) for local human rights cities’ initiatives that further 
the broad goals of the ICCPR, CERD, and the CAT beyond the baseline of 
federal standards.  
B. Sanctuary Jurisdictions 
Sanctuary jurisdictions are not explicitly grounded in human rights norms, 
but are local governments that resist federal efforts to redirect local law 
enforcement resources to assist the federal government in identifying and 
deporting undocumented residents.71 While the phrase “sanctuary city” is in 
wide use, it is not a legal term; some cities and other jurisdictions with sanctuary-
type policies designate themselves as “safe communities.”72 Further, 
jurisdictions identified as “sanctuaries” may adopt varying levels of resistance 
to federal pressure, depending upon local political will.73 Self-proclaimed 
sanctuary jurisdictions in the United States include Boston, San Francisco, 
Chicago, and hundreds of other cities, counties, and other subnational 
jurisdictions across the country.74 A few sanctuary jurisdictions are also human 
rights cities; Boston is an example of this dual identification.75 
Sanctuary jurisdictions are under considerable pressure from the federal 
government to cooperate with immigration enforcement efforts, including by 
 
 70. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 3, art. 18. 
 71. See Jasmine C. Lee, Rudy Omri & Julia Preston, What are Sanctuary Cities?, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/09/02/us/sanctuary-cities.html?_r=0 
[https://perma.cc/J4ZQ-29XS]. 
 72. For example, pending sanctuary legislation in Massachusetts is denominated the Safe 
Communities Act. See, e.g., The Time to Act is Now: Support the Safe Communities Act!, MIRA 
COALITION, https://miracoalition.org/welcomingnh/164-about-us/664-support-safe-communities 
[https://perma.cc/MK3X-J232] (describing Safe Communities Act). For a philosophical analysis 
that grounds sanctuary cities in human rights norms, see SERENA PAREKH & MARTHA F. DAVIS, 
WHITE PAPER: BOSTON’S SANCTUARY CITY PROTECTIONS: A PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVE 
(2017), https://www.northeastern.edu/law/pdfs/academics/phrge/whitepaper-sanctuary.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/HUP3-MP5L]. 
 73. See generally Jennifer C. Critchley & Lisa J. Trembly, Historical Review, Current Status 
and Legal Considerations Regarding Sanctuary Cities, 306 N.J. LAW. 32, 32–33, 35–36 (2017) 
(describing variations among sanctuary cities). 
 74. Inez Friedman-Boyce et al., Sanctuary Cities: Distinguishing Rhetoric from Reality, 61 
BOS. B.J. 8, 10–11 (2017) (describing Boston’s sanctuary policy and pending litigation filed by San 
Francisco and others); Richard Gonzales, Mayor Rahm Emmanuel: ‘Chicago Will Always be a 
Sanctuary City,’ NPR (Nov. 14, 2016 7:57 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/ 
11/14/502066703/mayor-rahm-emanuel-chicago-always-will-be-a-sanctuary-city [https://perma. 
cc/L5BJ-ME5J]. 
 75. See CITY COUNCIL OF BOSTON, supra note 58 (discussing Boston’s identification as a 
human rights city). 
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detaining immigrants without a warrant.76 In part, the pressure arises from the 
Executive Order issued by President Trump asserting that federal law 
enforcement funding will be withheld from jurisdictions that fail to meet the 
demands of federal authorities.77 Pressure also arises from ongoing Immigration 
Control and Enforcement Authority (ICE) raids and other surveillance methods 
that specifically target sanctuary jurisdictions.78  
In response to this pressure, sanctuary jurisdictions typically argue that 
reporting on immigration status will undermine local law enforcement 
effectiveness by instilling fear in immigrant residents and discouraging 
individuals in immigrant communities from having positive interactions with 
law enforcement authorities.79 Further, the chilling effect of such reporting may 
discourage both documented and undocumented immigrants from accessing 
local education and social services to which they are entitled.80 For example, 
citizen children may be afraid to attend school if they believe that it may lead to 
their parents’ deportation.81 Victims of domestic violence may be afraid to 
obtain assistance from courts or agencies if it will mean a risk of deportation 
given reports of ICE officials making arrests at the courthouse door.82   
 
 76. In many jurisdictions, city police coordinate with county jails, and it is the county officials 
who actually make the determination of whether to honor a federal detainer request. See, e.g., Darla 
Cameron, How Sanctuary Cities Work and How Trump’s Blocked Executive Order Could have 
Affected Them, WASH. POST (Nov. 21, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/national/ 
sanctuary-cities/ [https://perma.cc/LA88-M3N6]; see also LENA GRABER & NIKKI MARQUEZ, 
IMMIGRATION LEGAL RES. CTR., SEARCHING FOR SANCTUARY 6 (2016), https://www.ilrc.org/ 
sites/default/files/resources/sanctuary_report_final_1-min.pdf [https://perma.cc/C8DG-5AE3] 
(“Counties, not cities, are the most important policy-makers in terms of establishing sanctuary 
policies.”). 
 77. Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States, Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 
Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 30, 2017). 
 78. See, e.g., Joel Rubin, ICE Arrests Hundreds of Immigrants in ‘Sanctuary Cities’ Around 
the Nation, California, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2017, 6:00 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow 
/la-me-ice-raids-sanctuary-20170928-story.html [https://perma.cc/M7X2-DF26]. 
 79. See GRABER & MARQUEZ, supra note 76, at 24 (describing rationales for sanctuary 
policies); see also Benjamin Gonzales, et al., The Politics of Refuge: Sanctuary Cities, Crime, and 
Undocumented Immigration, URBAN AFFAIRS REV. (May 7, 2017), https://doi.org/10.1177/107808 
7417704974. 
 80. Lindsay Bever, Hispanics ‘Are Going Further into the Shadows’ Amid Chilling 
Immigration Debate, Police Say, WASH. POST (May 12, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
news/post-nation/wp/2017/05/12/immigration-debate-might-be-having-a-chilling-effect-on-crime 
-reporting-in-hispanic-communities-police-say/?utm_term=.5e01e5eba36e [https://perma.cc/YHJ 
3-X9XE]. 
 81. See, e.g., Catalina Amuedo-Dorantes & Mary J. Lopez, The Hidden Educational Costs of 
Intensified Immigration Enforcement, 84 SOUTHERN ECON. J. 120, 124–125 (2017). 
 82. Richard Gonzales, ICE Detains Alleged Victim of Domestic Abuse at Texas Courthouse, 
NPR (Feb. 16, 2017, 10:33 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwoway/2017/02/16/515685385/ 
ice-detains-a-victim-of-domestic-abuse-at-texas-courthouse [https://perma.cc/J5ZT-H6E7]. See 
generally THE FUND FOR MODERN COURTS, PROTECTING THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN 
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In adopting sanctuary policies, subnational governments are acting in 
spheres that are reserved to them under principles of domestic federalism, i.e., 
police power, education, and community social services.83 Further, the 
principles underlying local sanctuary policies are consistent with international 
human rights obligations accepted by the United States through its formal treaty 
ratification, such as the right to security, the right to equal treatment, and the 
right to fair and equal procedures.84 These rights, protected by the ICCPR, the 
CERD, and the CAT, extend to all residents of a territory, regardless of 
citizenship.85 While national-level immigration restrictions are per se valid as 
core exercises of national sovereignty, that does not mean that undocumented 
individuals present within a jurisdiction forego all rights.86 Importantly, many 
of the rights held by undocumented residents are the province of local 
governments, which recognize and uphold them in part through their sanctuary 
policies.87   
Jordan Paust has argued that the federalism clauses serve to delegate and 
guarantee a competence of state and local authorities to act affirmatively to 
implement human rights and to have those choices protected as long as they are 
otherwise in fulfillment of the treaties. Thus, the federal clauses support state 
and local competencies to participate in treaty effectuation in ways that might 
otherwise have been suspect under more inhibiting notions of federal 
preemption.88 At least one scholar, Brad Roth, has labeled Paust’s reading of the 
federalism clauses “far-fetched.”89 According to Roth, the ICCPR provisions 
addressed through the federalism understanding “pertain precisely to those 
exercises of the police power that are least likely to be federally preempted.”90  
 
NEW YORK STATE: IMPACT OF ICE ARRESTS ON NEW YORKERS’ ACCESS TO STATE 
COURTHOUSES (2017). 
 83. See, e.g., Santiago Legarre, The Historical Background of the Police Power, 9 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 745, 747–48 (2007); see also San Antonio Independent Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 
U.S. 1, 40–44 (1973) (deferring to traditional state authority over education). 
 84. See GRABER & MARQUEZ, supra note 76, at 23. 
 85. On human rights extending to non-residents, see Hope Lewis & Rachel Rosenbloom, The 
Boston Principles: An Introduction, 1 NOTRE DAME J. INT’L COMP. & HUM. RTS. L. 145, 153–56 
(2011); see also G.A. Res. 40/144, Declaration on the Human Rights of Individuals Who Are Not 
Nationals of the Country in Which They Live (Dec. 13, 1985). 
 86. David Cole, Are Foreign Nationals Entitled to the Same Constitutional Rights as 
Citizens?, 25 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 367, 372 (2003). See also PAREKH & DAVIS, WHITE PAPER, 
supra note 72, at 9–12. 
 87. See Lewis & Rosenbloom, supra note 85, at 154–55. 
 88. Jordan J. Paust, Customary International Law and Human Rights Treaties are Law of the 
United States, 20 MICH. J. INT’L L. 301, 330–31 (1999). 
 89. Bradley Roth, Understanding the “Understanding”: Federalism Constraints on Human 
Rights Implementation, 47 WAYNE L. REV. 891, 905 (2001). 
 90. Id. 
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Roth’s position has some logic to support it. As set out above, the ICCPR’s 
federalism understanding may, by the nature of the underlying treaty, target 
areas overlapping with state police power where the federal government is more 
likely to acknowledge that subnational jurisdictions have some independent 
authority.91  
But that is where the logic ends. The ICCPR is not the only treaty that carries 
a federalism understanding; the provisions of CERD and CEDAW, for instance, 
extend beyond areas of police power, indicating that federalism understandings 
also have broader implications.92 Further, even under the ICCPR, the current 
Presidential administration is pursuing preemption of local rights-protective 
sanctuary policies that are within the scope of traditional police power, 
undermining the premise on which Roth’s narrow reading of the federalism 
clause is based.93 This operational reality invites a re-evaluation of the precise 
meaning of the federalism understanding, if only to protect the United States 
from regressing in its compliance with human rights obligations. 
Consistent with Professor Paust’s view, then, the federalism understanding 
can be seen as a response to the broadest interpretation of Missouri v. Holland, 
e.g., an effort to balance local and federal authority in the human rights arena 
after the Missouri v. Holland Court’s assertion of federal preeminence. Rather 
than permit general federal preemption of state prerogatives through purported 
exercise of treaty power, the federalism understanding would shield 
“appropriate” rights-protective measures taken by local governments within 
their sphere of authority.  
Despite obvious tensions, this approach is not necessarily inconsistent with 
the implications of the Supreme Court’s decision in Arizona v. United States. 94 
The Court there struck down several of Arizona’s anti-immigrant measures as 
pre-empted by federal law, but stopped short from striking a state law that 
required state police to investigate the immigration status of individuals who 
were stopped, detained, or arrested.95 The logic of the opinion leaves open the 
possibility that more rights-protective local measures that operate in areas 
reserved to states, beyond the scope of a domestic federal scheme, could also be 
upheld.96 That would seem to be the clear import of the federalism clauses, 
 
 91. Kaye, supra note 17, at 110–14. 
 92. CERD, supra note 1, art. 5, § e. 
 93. See Exec. Order No. 13768, supra note 77, at 8801. 
 94. Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012). 
 95. Id. at 411–15. 
 96. See Peter J. Spiro, Preemption After Arizona: Rebuttal: State Action on Immigration (Bad 
and Good) After Arizona v. United States, 161 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 100, 108 (2012) (“So long 
as they don’t go too far . . . the states can roll out something like a welcome mat by opting for more 
generous benefits for immigrants.”); Stella Burch Elias, The New Immigration Federalism, 74 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 703, 705–06 (2013) (heralding opportunities for “immigrant inclusionary” local 
rulemaking in the wake of Arizona v. United States). 
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which of course are themselves attributable to the federal government just as the 
“comprehensive schemes” cited by the Arizona Supreme Court in support of 
preemption.97   
CONCLUSION 
The federalism clauses have been widely criticized as an effort to limit 
federal obligations under ratified treaties. However, a closer look at their exact 
language and usage in U.S. treaty debates suggests the possibility of other 
interpretations. In this essay, I take the federalism clauses at face value and 
examine their potential impact on local human rights implementation—both 
when human rights norms are invoked explicitly, as in the human rights city 
context, and when human rights arguments are simply available, as in the context 
of sanctuary jurisdictions.  
This preliminary examination suggests the possibility of a more positive 
perspective on the federalism clauses as expressly protective of rights-expanding 
local initiatives. While the federalism understandings preserve the federal-state 
balance, they suggest that the federal government should usurp state-level 
human rights initiatives only when the federal substitute is more “appropriate” 
or rights-protective than the local policy it eclipses. 
This analysis would suggest that the United States violates its treaty 
obligations, as filtered through the federalism clauses, when it interferes with 
local human rights initiatives that are furthering U.S. treaty objectives and that 
are within the purview of local actors. These U.S. treaty violations should be 
critiqued on the international stage by treaty monitoring bodies even as they are 
challenged at home in domestic fora.98 
Local actors might glean from this analysis that there is some utility to 
framing rights-protective initiatives through a human rights lens in order to 
clarify the shield that the federalism clause potentially provides against federal 
interference with such subnational initiatives. 
 
 
 97. Arizona, 567 U.S. at 406–07. 
 98. See, e.g., Vivian Yee, California Sues Justice Dept. Over Funding for Sanctuary Cities, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/14/us/california-sues-trump-ad 
ministration-over-sanctuary-city-policy.html [https://perma.cc/532P-83X3]. 
